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California Supreme Court Survey
November 1987-January 1988
The California Supreme Court Survey is a brief synopsis of recent decisions
by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the readerof the
issues that have been addressed by the supreme cour4 as well as to serve as a
startingpointfor researchingany of the topical areas. The decisions are analyzed in accordancewith the importance of the court's holding and the extent
to which the court expands or changes existing law. Attorney discipline cases
have been omitted from the survey.
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I.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A.

The FairEmployment and Housing Commission lacks
authority to impose punitive damages in resolving
employment discriminationcomplaints: Dyna-Med, Inc. v.
Fair Employment & Housing Commission.

In Dyna-Med, Inc. v. FairEmployment & Housing Commission, 43
Cal. 3d 1379, 743 P.2d 1323, 241 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1987), the court held
that the Fair Employment and Housing Commission (the Commission) has no authority to impose punitive damages when resolving
employment discrimination disputes. Although punitive damages
have been upheld in a litigation context, the court determined that
section 12970(a) of the Government Code grants the Commission
only corrective and equitable powers. See Commodore Home Sys.,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 3d 211, 649 P.2d 912, 185 Cal. Rptr. 270
(1982); 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 863C (8th

ed. Supp. 1984).
Initially, a sex discrimination complaint was filed with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing by a female employee of
Dyna-Med. The ultimate settlement included an agreement by the
employer to refrain from retaliatory action. However, five hours after executing the agreement, Dyna-Med discharged the employee. In
resolving the employee's newly-filed complaint, the Commission ordered back pay and $7,500 in punitive damages against Dyna-Med.
At issue on appeal was the Commission's statutory authority to impose punitive damages in employment discrimination cases. Section
12970(a) provides that the Commission may "take such action, including, but not limited to, hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of employees, with or without back pay . . . as, in the judgment of the
commission" is necessary to eliminate discriminatory employment
practices. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12970(a) (West 1980 & Supp. 1988) (emphasis added). The court of appeal concluded that the imposition of
punitive damages is within the scope of this language.
To resolve the interpretation of section 12970(a), the court first examined the statutory language itself, in light of its legislative purpose. The purpose of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (the
Act) is to provide effective remedies to eliminate discriminatory practices. See 1980 Cal. Stat. 3140 (codified in part at CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 12900 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988)). The court noted that the suggested remedies in section 12970(a) are exclusively corrective and equitable in nature-designed to make the employee "whole."

Consequently, the court concluded that had the Legislature intended
to authorize punitive damages, it would have expressly done so. See
generally 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional
Law §§ 426-30 (8th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1984); 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil
Rights §§ 223-25, 445 (1976); 12 CAL. JUR. 3D Civil Rights §§ 10-12
(1974 & Supp. 1987); 41 CAL. JUR. 3D Labor §§ 4-5 (1978 & Supp.
1987).
The court rejected the Commission's argument that the language
"including, but not limited to" enabled the Commission to impose punitive damages. The court acknowledged that punitive damages
would serve as a deterrent to employment discrimination. However,
were the Legislature's silence on this issue to be taken as a mandate,
every administrative agency with remedial powers would be entitled
to impose punitive damages. Therefore, the court preferred to interpret the section as limiting the Commission's authority to corrective,
equitable remedies. Such interpretation would then be consistent
with section 3294(a) of the Civil Code, which allows punitive damages
only in cases of "oppression, fraud, or malice." See CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3294(a) (West 1970 & Supp. 1988). The court emphasized that the
Commission has sufficient authority to fashion appropriate remedies
without resorting to punitive damages. See 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 848-49 (8th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1984); 22
AM. JUR. 2D Damages §§ 236-42 (1965 & Supp. 1987); 23 CAL. JUR. 3D
Damages §§ 116-121 (1975 & Supp. 1987).
The court then found the Act's history ambiguous and, consequently, of little guidance. Thus, the court compared the statutory
language to that found in section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982) (hereinafter NLRA), and in section 706(g) of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(g) (1982). Both sections have been interpreted by federal courts as
barring monetary remedies exclusive of back pay. See, e.g., Shah v.
Mt. Zion Hospital & Medical Center, 642 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir. 1981);
Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829, 837 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
Further, even though the NLRA and the Act have different purposes, the court surmised that the Legislature's use of identical language from the NLRA was intended to grant the Commission
equivalent authority.
The court also discounted the Commission's equal protection argument. The court reasoned that the availability of punitive damages in
administrative proceedings would hamper the conciliation process.
Moreover, a complainant is not precluded from seeking punitive
damages in an independent civil suit.
Thus, the court's withdrawal of the Commission's self-imposed authority to award punitive damages in employment discrimination
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cases is a clear victory for employers. The court's cautious approach
to separation of powers issues bounces this ball right back to the legislature. The court refuses to imply harsh remedies, such as punitive
damages, in the absence of sufficient support from the legislative history. Fortunately, however, with its broad remedial powers, the
Commission can still make retaliatory action by naive employers an
unpleasant option. See generally Gelb & Frankfurt, California'sFair
Employment and Housing Act: A Viable State Remedy for Employment Discrimination,34 HASTINGS L.J. 1055 (1983); 45B AM. JUR. 2D
Job Discrimination§§ 1740, 2428-31 (1986).
BARBARA A. BAYLISS

B. Prepayment injunctive relief in Board of Equalization
disputes is availableonly where the assessment is
completely without merit: Western Oil and Gas Association v.
State Board of Equalization.
In Western Oil and Gas Association v. State Board of Equalization,
44 Cal. 3d 208, 745 P.2d 1360, 242 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1987), the supreme
court unanimously reversed the trial court's decision to grant prepayment injunctive relief to an oil industry association and seven oil
companies against the State Board of Equalization (the Board). The
Board required the oil companies to disclose certain information
pertaining to land and rights of way, in order to levy assessments on
inter-county pipelines. The plaintiffs opposed this disclosure requirement, and thus sought to enjoin its enforcement.
Until 1936, the Board based its authority for such disclosure on article XIII, section 19 of the California Constitution, which mandates
that the Board "annually assess pipelines . . . lying within 2 or more
counties .... " However, in 1936 the supreme court provided a comprehensive definition of pipeline for interpreting the constitutional
provision. See Pipe Line Co. v. State Board of Equalization,5 Cal. 2d
253, 256-57, 54 P.2d 18, 20 (1936). This definition did not specifically
refer to land and rights of way; consequently, the Board abrogated
this disclosure requirement.
In 1982, the Board reimposed a right to assess lands and rights of
way by requiring companies to submit this information in their annual property statements. Enforcement of this policy would be effected by assessing penalties for noncompliance with section 830(a) of
the Revenue and Taxation Code. The plaintiffs filed suit to prevent
compulsory disclosure of this information.

The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that the Board had
no authority to assess the companies' lands and rights of way. Therefore the compulsory disclosure was unwarranted. The supreme court
reversed, holding that the Board's authority was not at issue. The
court ruled that article XIII, section 32 of the California Constitution
bars the prepayment relief sought by the companies, since no legal or
equitable proceeding can impede the collection of a tax. The court
emphasized, however, that this section is broadly construed to limit
court intervention in tax collection matters. Only when the government has no chance of prevailing on its claim will prepayment injunctive relief be available. See Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. State
Board of Equalization,27 Cal. 3d 277, 283 n.8, 611 P.2d 463, 467 n.8,
165 Cal. Rptr. 122, 126, n.8 (1980) (citing Enoch v. Williams Packing
Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962)). Accordingly, taxes must be paid first; then
an action may be maintained to recover them. See generally 51 CAL.
JUR. 3D Property Taxes § 206 (1979 & Supp. 1987). The court considered the Board's new policy to be wholly without merit, and thus remanded the action to the trial court for further factfinding.
LESLIE GLADSTONE

II.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A prosecutor'sintimidation of defense witnesses by threat
of arrestfollowing witness' testimony constitutes
governmental interference with defendant's constitutional
right to compulsory process: In re Martin.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In In re Martin,' the court held that the prosecutor's intimidation
of defense witnesses violated the defendant's constitutional right to
produce witnesses in his favor. 2 The court determined that a showing of prosecutor misconduct was required to prove such interference
with the defendant's rights, but that bad faith or improper motives
were not required.3 The court concluded that prosecutor misconduct
was established by the arrest of the petitioner's first witness outside
1. 44 Cal. 3d 1, 744 P.2d 374, 241 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1987). The court opinion was
unanimous and authored by Justice Mosk.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; accord, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15. See also 21A AM. JUR.
2D Criminal Law §§ 717-19 (1981).
3. Martin, 44 Cal. 3d at 31, 744 P.2d at 393, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 282 (citing United
States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 227 (3d Cir. 1976)). However, conviction of the prosecutor under section 136.1 of the Penal Code requires specific intent to dissuade the witness from testifying. People v. Ford, 145 Cal. App. 3d 985, 989, 193 Cal. Rptr. 684, 689
(1983). See generally B.L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (1986) (cited in
Edwards, Book Review, 7 PACE L. REV. 463, 464 (1987)); B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
CRIMES 800 (Supp. 1985).
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the courtroom immediately after testifying, and by informing other
witnesses that they would also be arrested for any crimes disclosed
by their testimony and in so doing, inducing them not to testify.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Martin was convicted of second degree murder and other crimes
based primarily on the testimony of Powell, who claimed that he
murdered the victim on Martin's behalf. Martin produced witnesses
to refute the testimony, but each witness was subject to self-incrimination by testifying. The first defense witness, Stephen Aguilar, testified that he and Powell were friends and that Powell had asked
him prior to the murder to obtain an unmarked gun for him. Aguilar
obtained the gun from his neighbor, Charles Riley,4 and gave it to
Powell. This testimony directly contradicted Powell's testimony that
the gun was obtained by Martin. Immediately after Aguilar testified,
the prosecutor had him arrested as an accessory to murder, in the
presence of three other defense witnesses5 and a news reporter, in
the hallway of the courthouse. The prosecution's investigator admitted he knew that the witnesses were present when he made the
6
arrest. Aguilar was apparently never charged.
Riley was subpoenaed to testify that he was the source of the gun,
corroborating Aguilar's testimony. The prosecutor refused to grant
immunity; therefore, Riley invoked the fifth amendment. Martin
called Eugene Wallace as a witness to testify that Wallace and Powell
were cellmates and that Wallace helped Powell fabricate the story
implicating Martin. The prosecutor again refused to grant immunity;
therefore, Wallace invoked the fifth amendment. John Gross was
also called by Martin. Gross' testimony would have established that
while he and Powell were cellmates, Powell admitted that Martin
was not a participant in the murder, that Powell obtained the gun
from Aguilar, and that he and Wallace had fabricated the story.
Again, no immunity was granted and Gross invoked his fifth amendment rights. All three witnesses, Riley, Wallace, and Gross, were ini4. The identity of the neighbor was elicited during cross-examination of Aguilar.
Riley was subpoenaed and was one of the defense witnesses who refused to testify. His
testimony would have supported Aguilar's testimony that he had supplied the gun.
Martin, 44 Cal. 3d at 20, 744 P.2d at 386, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 275.
5. The prospective defense witnesses present all testified, but were not subject to
incrimination by doing so.
6. Martin, 44 Cal. 3d at 20, 744 P.2d at 385, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 274-75.

tially willing to testify and would have provided Martin's most
valuable defense.
Martin filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, together with a
motion to consolidate the appeal and the habeas proceeding. After
consolidating, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment and denied
the writ. Martin then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
California Supreme Court which was denied; Martin's subsequent pe7
tition was granted.
III.

THE COURT'S OPINION

Martin claimed relief on two grounds. The first was prosecutorial
interference with his constitutional right to present testimony at
trial. The second was the prosecution's introduction of false evidence. The court appointed a referee to make findings of fact and
law. The referee. concluded that Martin was entitled to relief on both
grounds.
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden of proof is on the petitioner.8 The court was satisfied that Martin had fulfilled his burden
as to the witness intimidation issue and therefore did not address the
false evidence ground for relief.
The court emphasized that pursuant to the sixth amendment of the
United States Constitution, "a criminal defendant has the right 'to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.' "9 Due
process mandates that the defendant have an opportunity to present
the essential elements of his case;10 and to present witnesses in
his defense." This right is also protected by the California Con12
stitution.
The right to produce witnesses may be violated by governmental
interference.' 3 The court maintained that interference includes
prosecutorial intimidation of defense witnesses, such as making statements to defense witnesses regarding prosecution for any crimes revealed by their testimony,14 or arresting defense witnesses before
7. New facts were alleged in the second petition and supported by new exhibits,
allowing the court to grant the petition even though it had been previously denied. Id
at 27 n.3, 744 P.2d at 390 n.3, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 279 n.3.
8. In re Riddle, 57 Cal. 2d 848, 852, 372 P.2d 304, 306, 22 Cal. Rptr. 472, 474 (1962).
9. Martin, 44 Cal. 3d at 29, 744 P.2d at 391, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 280 (quoting Westen,
The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 95 (1974)).

10. Id at 29, 744 P.2d at 391, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 280. See Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95,
98 (1972); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
11. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).
12. CAL. CONST. art. I § 15.
13. Martin, 44 Cal. 3d at 30, 744 P.2d at 392, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 281; see also B.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES 800 (1963).
14. Martin, 44 Cal. 3d at 31, 744 P.2d at 392, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 281 (citing People v.
Warren, 161 Cal. App. 3d 961, 973, 207 Cal. Rptr. 912, 918 (1984)).
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they testify.15
The court acknowledged that evidence of bad faith or improper
motive on the part of the prosecution was not required. 16 The defendant must only establish misconduct and that this misconduct was
a "substantial cause" of his inability to present a witness. 17 Finally,
the defendant must show that the testimony that would have been
given but for the interference was "'material and favorable to his
defense.' "18
The court held that the time, place, and manner of Aguilar's arrest
was improper. The evidence showed that a joint decision was made
between the prosecutor and the prosecution's investigator to arrest
Aguilar after he testified. 19 The investigator decided to have the
arrest take place in the hallway of the courthouse where three defense witnesses were waiting to testify.2 0 News of the arrest was
broadcast and published in the local newspapers. The court felt it
was clear that the arrest, which was known to the three defense witnesses who later refused to testify, "was of such character as 'to
transform [a defense witness] from a willing witness to one who
would refuse to testify.' "21 The court concluded that the arrest of
22
Aguilar was prosecutorial misconduct.
The court further ruled that the prosecution, by engaging in misconduct toward Riley, interfered with Martin's right to present witnesses. When Riley appeared after being subpoenaed, the trial court
determined that he should seek counsel before testifying. The prosecutor informed Riley's attorney that he would arrest Riley if he testified. Additionally, the prosecutor's investigator asked Riley to
accompany him into the hallway. The court resolved that intimidation had occurred, since even the prosecutor's factual account established that Riley had been told he would be arrested if he implicated
15. Rd at 31, 744 P.2d at 393, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 282 (citing Bray v. Peyton, 429 F.2d
500, 501 (4th Cir. 1970)).
16. Id (citing United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 227 (3d Cir. 1976)).
17. 1& (citing Berg v. Morris, 483 F. Supp. 179, 184 (E.D. Cal. 1980); People v. Warren, 161 Cal. App. 3d 961, 974, 207 Cal. Rptr. 912, 919 (1984); People v. Bryant, 157 Cal.
App. 3d 582, 590, 203 Cal. Rptr. 733, 736 (1984)).
18. 1& at 32, 744 P.2d at 393, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 282 (quoting United States v.
Valenzuela Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982)).
19. 1& at 34, 744 P.2d at 395, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 284.
20. Id
21. 1& at 35, 744 P.2d at 395, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 285 (quoting United States v. Smith,
478 F.2d 976, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
22. Id, at 35, 744 P.2d at 395, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 285.

himself in criminal activity.23 The court stated that it was "clearly
coercive" for a prosecutor to inform a witness of the likelihood of
24
prosecution due to his testimony.
Moving to the intimidation of Wallace, the court determined that
he, too, had been subject to prosecutorial interference. Wallace had
contacted Martin's attorney and told him that he would reveal valuable exculpatory information in return for money. Martin's attorney
contacted the prosecutor; the prosecutor's investigator was subsequently sent to interview Wallace. The investigator admitted to talking with Wallace about his involvement in extortion and the
likelihood that his testimony would result in criminal charges. Following Wallace's subpoena, the prosecutor told Wallace's counsel that
his testimony would lead to prosecution for any criminal acts disclosed. The prosecutor clearly indicated that the extortion would be
revealed on cross-examination. Thus the court similarly ruled that
2
Wallace was improperly threatened. 5
Finally, the court concluded that prosecutorial interference also
existed with regard to Gross. Although the prosecution did not specifically threaten Gross, the court decided that the misconduct need
not be directed toward the witness individually. 26 The court stated
flatly that the intimidation caused Gross not to testify. The court
noted that although Gross' testimony would not have incriminated
him since Gross was not a "criminal sophisticate," he could have reasonably believed that testifying for the petitioner would adversely affect his upcoming sentence in another case. 27 The court concluded
that Martin sustained his burden of showing that the testimony was
material and that the prosecutorial misconduct was a substantial
cause of all three witnesses' failure to testify.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The court concluded that Martin was entitled to relief for
prosecutorial misconduct. However, the court did not buy his argument that such misconduct warranted a dismissal of his case, 28 stating that while the misconduct was "serious," it was not "gross" as
23. Id, at 37, 744 P.2d at 397, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 286.
24. Id, See also United States v. Hammond, 598 F.2d 1008, 1012 (5th Cir. 1979) (defense witness threatened with retaliation in other cases pending against him); United

States v. Thomas, 488 F.2d 334, 335 (6th Cir. 1973) (defense witness told by secret service agent that he would be prosecuted for a felony if he testified).
25. Martin, 44 Cal. 3d at 44-45, 744 P.2d at 401-02, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 290-91.

26. Id at 49, 744 P.2d at 404, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
27. Id at 50, 744 P.2d at 405, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
28. The court reasoned that even in a habeas proceeding, the petitioner is subject
to retrial unless he has been "effectively acquitted of the offense in question." Id. at
53, 744 P.2d at 407, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
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required for a violation of due process. 29 Although the distinction between serious and gross is unclear from the opinion, the misconduct
was sufficient for the court to remand the case.
A defendant's right to produce a defense is paramount. To allow
blatant intimidation, such as that which occurred in Martin, would
certainly impede the defendant's effectiveness in asserting this right.
Although the prosecutor had absolute discretion whether or not to
grant immunity, "'[a] simple no would have sufficed.' "30
LESLIE GLADSTONE

III.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A.

Contemptuous status offenders may be incarceratedwhen
actions ignoring the court's order are egregious, less
restrictive alternativeswould be ineffective, and the status
offender is segregatedfrom juvenile delinquents during
incarceration: In re Michael G.

In In re Michael G., 44 Cal. 3d 283, 747 P.2d 1152, 243 Cal. Rptr. 224
(1988), the California Supreme Court held that a contemptuous status offender could be incarcerated when certain criteria are met. The
petitioner, a minor, was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court for truancy and was ordered to attend school on a regular basis. There was
no dispute that the petitioner fully understood the court order and
willfully disobeyed it. As a result of his actions, the petitioner was
held in contempt of court and ordered to be incarcerated for fortyeight hours. However, before enforcing the sentence, the court asked
the petitioner to seek review by writ to determine whether the court
had the power to incarcerate status offenders. Id. at 288, 747 P.2d at
1155, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 227. The Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and the
supreme court then granted review.
There were two significant and conflicting policies the court considered in determining whether a contemptuous status offender could
be incarcerated. The first was an express legislative intent not to in29. Id, at 55, 744 P.2d at 409, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 298. Contra 21 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3232 n.56 (1985). The United States Supreme Court has held that compulsory process for obtaining witnesses is so fundamental that it is incorporated in the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 21A Am. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 718
(1981).
30. Martin, 44 Cal. 3d at 45, 744 P.2d at 402, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 291 (citation
omitted).

carcerate minors for merely being status offenders. CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 601(b) (West 1984). A status offender, by definition, is a
minor who has committed an act which would not have been considered criminal if they had been an adult, but is determined to be unacceptable behavior for someone their age. Id. at 287 n.2, 747 P.2d at
1154 n.2, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 226 n.2. The Legislature, in two statutes,
has addressed the issue of incarcerating status offenders. First, section 601(b) of the Welfare and Institutions Code provides: "it is the
intent of the Legislature that no minor who is adjudged a ward of the
court pursuant solely to this subdivision shall be removed from the
custody of the parent or guardian except during school hours." CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 601(b). Second, section 207(a) provides: "[n]o
minor shall be detained in any jail, lockup, juvenile hall, or other secure facility who is taken into custody solely upon the ground that he
or she is a person described by section 601 or adjudged to be such or
made a ward of the juvenile court solely upon that ground. . . ." CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 207(a) (West Supp. 1988).
In contrast, all courts have an inherent power to impose penalties
upon individuals found in contempt of court because without this
power, courts cannot effectively enforce orders. In re Michael G., 44
Cal. 3d at 288, 747 P.2d at 1155, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 227. In California,
for example, an individual can be incarcerated for a maximum of five
days if held to be in contempt of court. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1218
(West 1982).
In resolving this issue, the court first noted that section 213 unequivocally confers upon the juvenile court the power to hold individuals in contempt of court. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 213 (West
1984). The court next reasoned that because there are no express
special limitations as to the penalties the juvenile court can prescribe,
the sanctions set forth in section 1218 of the Code of Civil Procedure
are controlling. In re Michael G., 44 Cal. 3d at 289 n.3, 747 P.2d at
1155 n.3, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 227 n.3. Therefore, the court determined
that unless express statutory language indicates otherwise, the juvenile court must retain the fundamental power to incarcerate any individual who is held to be in contempt of court.
In analyzing the history of sections 207 and 601, the court specifically found no express statement to indicate that the Legislature intended to impinge upon the juvenile court's contempt powers, and
further, the court refused to presume any intent. Id. at 294, 747 P.2d
at 1159, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 231. However, the court was careful not to
overrule a previous holding by the court of appeal in In re Ronald S.,
69 Cal. App. 3d 866, 138 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1977). In that case, a status
offender disobeyed an order by the juvenile court and the offender
was found to be in violation of section 602 which expressly permitted
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the incarceration of minors due to the nature of the offenses covered
by the section. The appellate court reversed, expressly disapproving
of the "bootstrapping" procedure which transformed a status offender into a juvenile delinquent for disobeying a court order. Id. at
870-71, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 390. The present court held that a contemptuous status offender is not a section 602 ward and must be segregated from juvenile delinquents when incarcerated. In re Michael G.,
44 Cal. 3d at 300, 747 P.2d at 1163, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
The court was also persuaded by the decisions of other state courts
which have held that contemptuous status offenders can be incarcerated despite a legislative intent generally banning such detentions.
Id. at 296-97, 747 P.2d at 1154, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 227 (citing Interest of
Darlene C., 278 S.C. 664, 301 S.E.2d 136 (1983)); State v. Norlund, 31
Wash. App. 725, 644 P.2d 724 (1982); In re G.B., 88 Ill. 2d 36, 430
N.E.2d (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 963 (1981); and State ex rel.
L.E.A. v. Hammergren, 294 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1980). In particular,
the court noted the Wisconsin Supreme Court's holding in Interest of
D.L.D., 110 Wis. 2d 168, 327 N.W.2d 682 (1983). It adopted that court's
standard for determining whether a status offender may be found in
contempt of court and incarcerated: "(1) the juvenile is given sufficient notice to comply with the order and understands its provisions;
(2) the violation of the court order is egregious; (3) less restrictive alternatives were considered and found to be ineffective; and (4) special confinement conditions are arranged consistent with . . . [the
statutory provisions barring intermingling with delinquents]." In re
Michael G., 44 Cal. 3d at 297, 747 P.2d at 1161, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
(quoting Interest of D.L.D., 110 Wis. 2d at 182, 327 N.W.2d at 689).
The court emphasized the soundness of such qualifications and admonished adherence to them. Id.
The decision in the present case was the most reasonable and logical in light of the dilemma confronted by the court. From a public
policy standpoint, a status offender should not be incarcerated simply
because the acts committed would not have been deemed criminal
had the minor been an adult. However, the very dignity of our judicial system is undermined if a court is powerless to enforce its orders
effectively against status offenders. The standard announced by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court and adopted by this court preserves the
power of the court and at the same time recognizes the policy considerations addressed in sections 201 and 601. The court will incarcerate
a contemptuous status offender in only the most limited of circumstances. Additionally, the court requires status offenders to be kept

physically separate from juvenile delinquents during incarceration.
The dangers contemplated by the legislature are thereby minimized,
if not altogether eliminated, by the adoption of the Wisconsin
standard.
RONALD PAUL SCHRAMM

B. A convicted felon who has been honorably dischargedfrom
the Youth Authority pursuant to section 1772 of the
California Welfare and Institution Code is nevertheless
permanently prohibitedfrom carryinga concealedfirearm:
People v. Bell.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In People v. Bell,1 the California Supreme Court affirmed both the
conviction and death penalty sentence for the defendant 2 in a special
circumstance murder. 3 In reaching its determination, the court clarified three separate areas of the law. First, the court unequivocally
stated that a defendant must prove all three elements of the D)uren4
standard to establish a prima facie case that a jury was not drawn
from a fair cross-section of the community. 5 Second, it reaffirmed

that prosecutorial misconduct will constitute reversible error only
when the probable result of the case would have been different if the
prosecutor refrained from the statement or action. 6 Finally, in a case
of first impression, the court held that a convicted felon, who has
subsequently been honorably discharged from the Youth Authority,

is still prohibited from carrying a concealable firearm. 7
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The defendant, Ronald Lee Bell, was accused of murder and attempted murder during the commission of a robbery. Bell, who had
been convicted of a. previous felony,8 was also accused of violating
1. 44 Cal. 3d 137, 745 P.2d 573, 241 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1987) (en banc). Justice Mosk
wrote the majority opinion with Chief Justice Lucas, and Justices Panelli, Eagleson,
and Kaufman concurring. Justices Broussard and Arguelles each authored separate
concurring and dissenting opinions.
2. Id at 144, 745 P.2d at 575, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 892.
3. At the time the murder was committed, section 190.2(c)(3)(i) of the California
Penal Code stated that a murder occurring during the commission of a robbery constitutes special circumstances, and the penalty, if the defendant was convicted, was either
death or confinement in a state prison for life without the possibility of parole. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 190.2(c)(3)(i) (1977) (current version at CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)
(17)(i) (West Supp. 1988)).
4. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979); see infra note 22.
5. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 148-49, 745 P.2d at 578-79, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 895-96.
6. Id at 151, 745 P.2d at 579, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 896-97.
7. Id at 161, 745 P.2d at 587, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
8. Bell was convicted of voluntary manslaughter ten years earlier when he fa-
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section 12021 of the California Penal Code9 which prohibits convicted
felons from carrying concealed firearms.O The defendant's principal
contention was that the prosecution's three eyewitnesses were mistaken in their identifications because his brother, Larry, was the actual perpetrator of the crimes. However, two of the witnesses
testified that they personally knew the defendant and all three
claimed that they were familiar with his brother, Larry."
At trial, the defense attempted to prove that Larry Bell was a viable suspect and that the eyewitnesses' identifications were unreliable.
They presented evidence which tended to show that Larry Bell had
the opportunity to perpetrate the crime because he left his hotel
room for forty-five minutes at approximately the same time the robbery occurred.12 Further, the police found a ring in Larry's possession which they believed was stolen during the incident. The defense
also presented Dr. Robert Shomer, an expert in eyewitness identification, who testified that the expectations and motivations of the witnesses were seriously affected by numerous factors,13 including the
fact that the defendant had ten years earlier murdered Alcus Dorton,
a relative of all three witnesses. However, the defense conspicuously
failed to introduce Larry Bell to the jury. This was especially significant in light of the fact that there was conflicting evidence as to
whether the two brothers actually looked similar.
The jury found the defendant guilty on all charges, 14 and because
the murder occurred during the commission of a robbery which constituted special circumstances as then enumerated in section
tally shot Alcus Dorton, who was the father of an eyewitness in the present case. I&
at 145 n.2, 745 P.2d at 576 n.2, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 893 n.2.
9.

CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 12021 (West 1982).

10. Id, ("Any person who has been convicted of a felony... [and] who owns or has
in his possession... [any] firearm capable of being concealed upon the person is guilty
of a public offense ....
).
11. Ernestine Jackson testified that she attended school with the defendant from
1962-1969 and lived in the same neighborhood as the Bell family. Ruby Judge, who
was only fourteen years old at the time of the incident, claimed to know both brothers.
The third witness, Dorothy Dorton, whose father was killed by the defendant in a separate incident, did not know him personally, but knew his brother. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at
146, 745 P.2d at 576, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
12. The robbery occurred at approximately 4:00 p.m. Marilyn Mitchell testified
that she spent the day in question with Larry Bell at a motel but that he left the room
for 30 to 45 minutes at about the time it was becoming dark outside. Id at 146-47, 745
P.2d at 577, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
13. Dr. Shomer discussed seven factors which he believed made the identification
of the eyewitnesses highly unreliable. Id at 147, 745 P.2d at 577, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
14. Id. at 144, 745 P.2d at 575, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 892.

190.2(c)(3)(i) of the California Penal Code,15 they imposed a death
sentence. The defendant was, therefore, automatically entitled to an
appeal under section 1239(b) of the California Penal Code.16
III.

MAJORITY OPINION

The majority addressed several procedural and substantive issues
raised by the defendant on appeal, including: 1) whether the defendant was denied his constitutional right to a representative jury; 2)
whether the verdict should be reversed because of various instances
of prosecutorial misconduct; and 3) whether section 12021 of the California Penal Code 17 applies to convicted felons who have subsequently been honorably discharged from the Youth Authority.
A.

Representative Jury and the Duren Standard

1 8 the United States Supreme Court deIn Taylor v. Louisiana,
clared that "the American concept of the jury trial contemplates a
jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community."' 9 The defendant contended that the jury selection procedures employed by
Contra Costa County systematically excluded blacks from venires
and thereby deprived him of his right to a representative jury. As evidence of this violation, the defendant relied on the decision in People
v. Buford,20 where the court of appeal found that there was a significant disparity between the number of blacks in the community and
the number of blacks in the jury panels under consideration.21 The
majority was unpersuaded by this argument.
The court authoritatively held that in order to demonstrate that
there has been a violation of the fair cross-section requirement, the
defendant must establish each element of the standard set forth in
Duren v. Missouri.22 In the present case, the defendant failed to pro15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(c)(3)(i) (1977) (current version at CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 190.2(a)(17)(i) (West Supp. 1988)).
16. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239(b) (West 1982). This section provides: "When upon
any plea a judgment of death is rendered, an appeal is automatically taken by the defendant without any action taken by him or his counsel." Id
17. Cal. Penal Code § 12021 (West 1982).
18. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
19. Id at 527.
20. 132 Cal. App. 3d 288, 182 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1982). Bz ford also originated in Contra Costa County.
21. Id. at 296, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
22. 439 U.S. 357 (1979). The three elements that are necessary to establish a prima
facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement are as follows:
1) that the group alleged to be excused is a "distinctive" group in the community;
2) that the representation of this group in the venires from which juries are
selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons
in the community; and
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duce the necessary statistical evidence to establish that the number
of blacks in the venire from which the jury was selected was not fair
and reasonable in relation to the number of blacks in the community.23 The court further held that the defendant could not rely on
24
the evidence presented in Buford to establish this element.
The defendant alternatively contended that he was not required to
prove that the venire was unrepresentative to establish a prima facie
violation of a fair cross-section requirement. The defendant relied on
the court's holding in People v. Harris25 as precedent for his position.
In Harris,the court found that the jury pool as a whole was unrepresentative because it was compiled from a list of registered voters and
the proportion of minorities who failed to register was larger than
that for the general public. 26 The Harriscourt concluded that suffi-

cient evidence existed to establish that the pool from which juries
were selected was unrepresentative. 27 The defendant's reliance on
Harris was erroneous because he did not challenge the composition
of the pool. Therefore, proof of the unrepresentative nature of the
venire was required under the second prong of the Duren standard.28
Thus, the majority held that he could not maintain that there was a
29
violation of the fair-cross-section requirement.
B.

The Fffect of ProsecutorialMisconduct

The defendant contended that certain actions and statements made
by the prosecutor during the course of the trial constituted misconduct, and therefore the verdict should have been reversed. However,
a finding of prosecutorial misconduct does not automatically constitute reversible error.30 The defendant argued that the court should
apply the reasonable doubt standard stated in Chapman v. Califor3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group
in the jury selection process.
Id at 364. As mentioned in the text, the California Supreme Court unquestionably approved the Duren standard. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 148-49, 745 P.2d at 578, 241 Cal. Rptr. at
895.
23. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 149, 745 P.2d at 578-79, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 895-96.
24. Id.
25. 36 Cal. 3d 36, 679 P.2d 433, 201 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 965 (1984).
26. Id. at 52, 679 P.2d at 441, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
27. Id. at 58, 679 P.2d at 445, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 794-95.
28. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 149, 745 P.2d at 579, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
29. Id,
30. See 5 CAL. JUR. 3D Appellate Review § 545 (1973). "Not every error occurring
in a legal proceeding is so serious as to vitiate the action of the trial court and warrant
reversal of its judgment or order." Id.

nia 31 to determine if the prosecutorial misconduct was prejudicial
and thereby required reversal. However, the court held that the
Chapman standard is only controlling when federal constitutional error is involved, 32 and since the instances of misconduct complained of
in this proceeding were of an evidentiary nature, the reasonable
doubt standard was not applicable. 33 Instead, the court adopted the
following standard: "Prosecutorial misconduct is cause for reversal
only when it is 'reasonably probable that a result more favorable to
the defendant would have occurred had the district attorney refrained from the comment attacked by the defendant.' "34
The court applied the standard outlined above to the specific instances where prosecutorial misconduct was found and held that
there were no grounds for reversal. 35 The first instance of misconduct complained of by the defendant was when the prosecutor violated a pre-trial stipulation by reading a statement made by an
unidentified informant while cross-examining a witness. 36 Although
the court found that the prosecutor's actions clearly constituted misconduct, the statement was not prejudicial because other testimony
heard by the jury established that the defendant owned a gun, and
37
the judge had also admonished the jury to disregard the statement.
The second instance in which the court found misconduct was when
the prosecutor repeatedly quoted People v. Guzman3 8 out of context.
In particular, the prosecutor tried to mislead the jury into believing
that the Guzman court held that the testimony of the defendant's expert witness was tantamount to the testimony of polygraph operators, hypnotists, and truth-drug administrators. 39 The court held that
although the comments were improper, it was unlikely that their ef40
fect was prejudicial, thus reversal was not required.
The court found other instances of prosecutorial misconduct which
31. 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
32. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 151, 745 P.2d at 580, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 897.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 151, 745 P.2d at 579, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 896-97 (quoting People v.
Beivelman, 70 Cal. 2d 60, 75, 447 P.2d 913, 921, 73 Cal. Rptr. 521, 529 (1968) (en banc)).
35. See infra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
36. The statement read by the prosecutor was: "Suspect had been observed in possession of a small-barrelled gun and was cleaning the weapon the day before the
crime." Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 150, 745 P.2d at 579, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
37. Id. at 151, 745 P.2d at 580, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 897.
38. 47 Cal. App. 3d 380, 121 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1975).
39. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 153-54, 745 P.2d at 581-82, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 898-99. The court,
in a footnote, made reference to People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 377, 690 P.2d 709,
727, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 254 (1984), which clearly recognized the importance of qualified
expert testimony on the subject of eyewitness identification. Further, the court disapproved of the comments made in Guzman to the extent that they were in conflict with
the holding in McDonald. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 154 n.5, 745 P.2d at 582 n.5, 241 Cal. Rptr.
at 899 n.5.
40. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 154, 745 P.2d at 582, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
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occurred during closing and rebuttal arguments as well as during the
penalty phase of the trial. 41 However, in each instance defense counsel failed to make a timely objection and, therefore, under the principle announced in People v. Green,42 the point could not be raised for
the first time on appeal. 43 The defendant argued that Green applies
only to the guilt phase of a trial and not to prosecutorial misconduct
that occurs during the penalty phase of a capital trial. The court disagreed and reiterated the policy underlying the Green decision that
the trial court should be given the opportunity to correct the abuses
by a prosecutor, which can only be realized if the defendant makes a
timely objection. 44
C. Application of section 12021
The defendant was convicted of violating section 12021 of the California Penal Code,45 which prohibits a convicted felon from possessing concealable firearms.46 The defendant contended that section
12021 should not apply because he was honorably discharged from
the Youth Authority. Section 1772(a) of the Welfare and Institutions
Code 47 provides that a person honorably discharged from the Youth
Authority will be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting
from the crimes which he committed. 48 Therefore, the issue
41. See id at 154-57, 163-66, 745 P.2d at 582-84, 588-90, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 899-901,
905-07.
42. 27 Cal. 3d 1, 609 P.2d 468, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980).
43. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 154, 745 P.2d at 582, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 899. The court recognized that the defendant could make a valid objection on appeal if it could be demonstrated that the error could not have been corrected by appropriate instructions. Id.
However, each instance of prosecutorial misconduct that was established could have
been corrected. Id. at 155-57, 163-66, 745 P.2d at 582-84, 588-90, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 899901, 905-07.
44. Id. at 164, 745 P.2d at 588-89, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 905-06.
45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12021 (West 1982).

46. Id See supra note 10 for text of the pertinent parts of the statute.
47. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1772(a) (West 1984).
48. Id. Section 1772(a) of the California Welfare and Institutions Code provides:
Every person honorably discharged from control by the Youthful Offender
Parole Board who has not, during the period of control by the authority been
placed by the authority in a state prison shall thereafter be released from all
penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or crime for which he or
she was committed, and every person discharged may petition the court which
committed him or her, and the court may upon such petition set aside the verdict of guilty and dismiss the accusation or information against the petitioner
who shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting
from the offense or crime for which he or she was committed, including, but
not limited to, any disqualification for any employment or occupational license, or both, created by any other provision of law.

presented was whether possession of a concealable firearm is a penalty or disability within the meaning of section 1772(a).
The majority first examined the underlying public policy considerations of the two statutes involved. The Youth Authority Act was
designed to "protect the public by subjecting youthful offenders to rehabilitation rather than retributive punishment...."49 Section 12021
was enacted, on the other hand, as part of a scheme designed to protect the public from the danger that is manifested from a convicted
felon carrying a firearm.50
From these policy considerations, the majority determined that denying a convicted felon the right to carry firearms is a frivolous burden, especially in light of the counterveiling public safety concerns. 5 1
The court also found that permitting convicted felons to carry firearms is inconsistent with the remedial purposes of the Youth Authority Act.52 Next, the court recognized that the Legislature has not
created any exceptions to section 12021 for any person who has been
convicted of a dangerous weapon felony.5 3 Finally, the court reasoned that since not even a gubernatorial pardon can restore a person's privilege to carry a concealed firearm, it is highly unlikely that
the Legislature intended to reinstate a privilege that it expressly denies under the pardoning power.54
IV.

A.

THE SEPARATE OPINIONS

JusticeBroussard'sConcurringand Dissenting Opinion

Justice Broussard strongly disagreed with the majority's interpretation of section 1772. He argued that the statute expressly states
that when a person is honorably discharged from the Youth Authority he is released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the
crime. 55 Because this language is clear and unambiguous, Justice
Broussard contended that the court should not have judicially construed the statute.5 6 Therefore, a convicted felon who receives an
honorable discharge should be released from the prohibitions imId.
49. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 160, 745 P.2d at 586, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 903 (citing People v.
Navarro, 7 Cal. 3d 248, 497 P.2d 481, 102 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1972)).
50. Id. at 161, 745 P.2d at 586-87, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 903-04.
51. Md at 161, 745 P.2d at 587, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 161-62, 745 P.2d at 587, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 904; see CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1203.4 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988) (successful probationers still subject to prohibitions
of section 12021).
54. I& at 162, 745 P.2d at 587, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
55. Id. at 171, 745 P.2d at 593, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 910-11 (Broussard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
56. ld,
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7
posed by section 12021 of the Penal Code.5
Alternatively, Justice Broussard argued that even if the language
of section 1772 was ambiguous, the majority erred in their construction of the statute.5 8 He contended that because there were two possible constructions of the statute, it is the policy of the state to
construe the section in a light most favorable to the defendant. 5 9 In a
formal opinion, the Attorney General stated that section 1772 releases an honorable dischargee from the prohibitions of section
12021.60 Additionally, the court had previously interpreted section
1203.4 of the Penal Code,61 which is similar to section 1772, as permitting convicted felons who successfully complete probation to be relieved of the strictures of section 12021.62 Therefore, the Justice
believed that the majority's construction of section 1772 was contrary
63
to the policy of the state.
Justice Broussard next noted that the Legislature had amended
the Youth Authority Act subsequent to judicial interpretation 64 of
the language in question.65 He cited South Dakota v. Brown 66 and
People v. Curtis67 for the proposition: "When the Legislature amends
a statute without changing language which has been judicially con-

57. Id. at 172, 745 P.2d at 594, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 911.
58. Id at 172, 745 P.2d at 594, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
59. Id at 172-73, 745 P.2d at 594-95, 241 Cal. Rptr. 912.
60. 32 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 43, 44, 46 (1958).
61. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West 1982).
62. See People v. Banks, 53 Cal. 2d 370, 388, 348 P.2d 102, 114, 1 Cal. Rptr. 669, 681
(1959) (en banc) ("[D]efendant would remain classified as one convicted of a felony
within the meaning of section 12021 of the Penal Code ... until defendant successfully
completed probation and received the statutory rehabilitation provided for by section
1203.4 of the Penal Code."). In People v. Taylor, 178 Cal. App. 2d 472, 479, 3 Cal. Rptr.
186, 190 (1960), the court of appeal found:
If one .. . has fulfilled the requirements of probation and secured a release
under section 1203.4, it is a fair inference that such a person should also be
released from that class of convicted felons to which section 12021 is applicable and should be restored to the right to possess a revolver ..
"
63. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 172-73, 745 P.2d at 594-95, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 912 (Broussard,
J., concurring and dissenting).
64. See supra note 62.
65. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 174, 745 P.2d at 595, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 912-13 (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
66. 20 Cal. 3d 765, 576 P.2d 473, 144 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1978). The court in Brown indi.
cated that "as a general rule, . . . when the Legislature enacts a law 'framed in the
identical language' of a previous law on the same subject, it is presumed that the new
law has the same fundamental meaning as the old law." Id. at 774, 476 P.2d at 479, 144
Cal. Rptr. at 764.
67. 70 Cal. 2d 347, 450 P.2d 33, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1969). The Curtis court stated,
"The rule of law is well established where the Legislature uses terms already judicially construed, 'the presumption is almost irresistible that it used them in the precise

strued, it is presumed that the Legislature intended to adopt the
prior judicial construction." 68 He therefore argued that the prior ju69
dicial interpretations of the term "all penalties and disabilities"
70
should be controlling in the present case.
Finally, Justice Broussard disagreed with the majority's affirmation of the death penalty sentence. He argued that the jury might
have considered the defendant's violation of section 12021 as aggravating the basic special circumstances murder offense, possibly a significant factor in determining the defendant's sentence. 71 Therefore,
since Justice Broussard believed that the conviction of violating section 12021 was erroneous, he would have reversed the death penalty
judgment. 72

B. Justice Arguelles' concurring and dissenting opinion
Justice Arguelles agreed with Justice Broussard that the defendant
did not violate section 12021. 73 He agreed with the Attorney Gen-

eral's formal opinion, concluding that an honorable dischargee from
the Youth Authority is relieved of the penalties and disabilities imposed by section 12021.74 Justice Arguelles argued that the court

should apply section 1772 as previously interpreted; if such application is contrary to policy considerations, then the Legislature should
amend it.

7

5

V.

CONCLUSION

The court's decision to prohibit honorable dischargees from carrying concealed firearms demonstrates its strong concern for public
safety. This decision does not hinder the rehabilitative purposes of
section 1772 and is consistent with the Legislature's uniform denial of
this privilege to convicted felons. By reaffirming the Duren standard, the court has unambiguously stated that statistical evidence is
necessary to establish that a jury was unrepresentative. The court's
and technical sense which had been placed upon them by the courts'." Id, at 355, 450
P.2d at 38, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
68. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 174, 745 P.2d at 595, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 912-13 (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
69. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
70. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 174-75, 745 P.2d at 595-96, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 912-13 (Broussard,
J., concurring and dissenting).
71. Id. at 176, 745 P.2d at 597, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 914.
72. IML
73. Id. at 176, 745 P.2d at 597, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 914 (Arguelles, J., concurring and
dissenting). Justice Arguelles concurred in the majority opinion in all other respects,
including the affirmation of the death penalty sentence. Id. at 177, 745 P.2d at 597-98,
241 Cal. Rptr. at 915.
74. See Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. supra note 60 at 44, 46.
75. Bell, 44 Cal. 3d at 177, 745 P.2d at 597, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 914 (Arguelles, J., concurring and dissenting).
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decision to impose a relatively high standard of review for determining reversible error in instances where there has been prosecutorial
misconduct is consistent with its previous holdings. There is no precedent to adopt a reasonable doubt standard when the error assigned
is only evidentiary in nature. Finally, by extending the holding of
Green, which prohibits a defendant from raising a contention of
prosecutorial misconduct when not originally objected to during the
trial, to the penalty phase of the proceeding, the court demonstrated
its reluctance to reverse a decision if the error could have been corrected by the trial court.
RONALD PAUL SCHRAMM
C. During voir dire, the evidence of a discriminatorypattern
of juror exclusion imposes a duty on the court to demand
justificationfrom counsel: People v. Snow.
In People v. Snow, 44 Cal. 3d 216, 746 P.2d 452, 242 Cal. Rptr. 477
(1987), the court reversed the defendant's conviction of first degree
murder because of the prosecution's misuse of peremptory challenges. During the course of the voir dire, the prosecution peremptorily challenged sixteen prospective jurors, six of whom were black.
The trial court rejected defense counsel's repeated requests to demand justification from the prosecutor that the challenges were nondiscriminatory in nature. The trial court indicated it was unsure of
applicable case law and would reserve judgment. The prosecutor argued that the restriction on peremptory challenges applied to both
parties, noting that the defendant had not excused any blacks. No
ruling was given on the defendant's reserved motion and the defendant's next motion was denied without comment. Ultimately, six
black prospective jurors were peremptorily challenged. The final
panel contained two black jurors.
The court dismissed as plain error the prosecutor's argument that
his peremptory challenges, even if wrongful, were justified by the defendant's lack of exclusion of blacks. The propriety of the prosecutor's actions stands on its own merits, and is not to be evaluated in
light of the defendant's challenges. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d
258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
Use of peremptory challenges to exclude an identifiable group of
persons simply because of a presumed group bias is improper.
Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890; see also People v. Johnson, 22 Cal. 3d 296, 583 P.2d 774, 148 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1978)

(dismissal of prospective black jurors based on race is improper); People v. Lewis, 144 Cal. App. 3d 267, 192 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1983) (no absolute right to a jury of one's own race). To allow the prosecution to
circumvent proper procedure by accepting two black jurors, thus
stopping short of total exclusion, would provide an easy means of justifying unlawful discrimination. Consequently, the court disapproved
People v. Davis, 189 Cal. App. 3d 1177, 234 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1987),
which suggested that the presence of two or three blacks on the jury
precluded the defense from establishing discriminatory exclusion.
The court concluded that the defendant had established a prima facie
case of group bias, Thus, as six years had passed since the voir dire
examination, the court held the error reversible per se under
Wheeler, rather than remand for prosecutorial justification. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 (1986).
The court then gave an advisory opinion as to the nonassertive conduct evidence admitted at trial. The prosecutor had testified that on
the eve of trial, in the defendant's presence, he discussed the victim's
murder. The prosecutor said that the defendant had not seemed surprised. The trial court, assuming that the defendant had heard this
conversation, deemed this to be an admission by silence. The
supreme court considered this inference improper, as there was no
accusation for the defendant to admit or deny. However, the court
found this evidence admissible for another purpose, namely, that the
defendant had prior knowledge of the killing..
Although federal law and other state laws are contrary, in Wheeler
the California Supreme Court held that the right to an impartial jury
drawn from a representative cross-section is a fundamental safeguard
of the California Declaration of Rights. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 160; see
47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 235 (1969 & Supp. 1987). Thus, the state constitution should govern rather than Supreme Court cases because it
provides more protection (which the states may do) against improper
jury selection. Sufficient evidence is established when an opponent
has struck most or all members of the identified group from the venire. See 21 CAL. JUR. 3D CriminalLaw § 3018 (rev. ed. 1985 & Supp.
1987) (emphasis added). Thus, maintaining a token representation of
a minority group on the jury without justification will be considered
improper conduct.
LESLIE GLADSTONE
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IV. EVIDENCE
On appeal, an evidentiary hearing is not required where
the decision of the defense counsel not to present
mitigating evidence at the penalty phase was the result of
a reasonably informed and competent tactical decision:
People v. Miranda.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In People v. Miranda,' the supreme court considered numerous assignments of error encompassing both the guilt and penalty phases of
a jury trial in which the defendant was convicted of first degree murder with special circumstances and sentenced to death under the 1978
death penalty law. The court dealt with the consolidation of the defendant's mandatory appeal and petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The supreme court affirmed both the trial court's judgment of guilt
and its imposition of the death penalty. The court also denied the defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The defendant, Adam Miranda, and the codefendant, Arnold Gonzales, went into a 7-Eleven store. After the clerk refused to sell them
beer due to the late hour, the defendant reached into his belt and
grabbed the handle of a gun. The clerk managed to dissuade the defendant from committing the robbery. The defendant and Gonzales
then entered an AM-PM market. Again their request to purchase
beer was denied. This prompted the defendant to point his gun at
the clerk and order him to put money into a bag. Gonzales noticed
that they were being recorded by the market's security camera. Moments later, the defendant shot and killed the clerk.
At the time of the arrest, the officers removed both a handgun and
a pocketknife from the pocket of the defendant's pants. A later
search conducted at the police station produced an unsealed envelope
containing an incriminating letter. The defendant was questioned
and then placed in a jail cell containing hidden microphones which
recorded the defendant's confession. Along with the security recordings from both markets, the jail cell tapes were admitted into
1. 44 Cal. 3d 57, 744 P.2d 1127, 241 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1987). Justice Panelli wrote the
majority opinion with Justices Arguelles, Eagleson, Kaufman, and Chief Justice Lucas
concurring. Justice Broussard wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion with
Justice Mosk concurring.

evidence.2
The defendant and Gonzales were found guilty of first degree murder, attempt to commit murder, and burglary.3 The jury made a special finding that the murder of the clerk "was willful, deliberate and
premeditated and that the killing occurred as a result of the attempt
to commit the crime of robbery."4
III.
A.

THE MAJORITY OPINION

The Guilt Phase

The defendant claimed that his constitutional right to represent
himself as co-counsel was violated pursuant to Faretta v. State.5 The
court held that Faretta did not apply because the holding specifically
addressed a defendant's right to present his own defense-it did not
resolve the question of whether a defendant has a constitutional right
to act as co-counsel.6 Looking to pre-Farettacases for assistance, the
court held that it is within the sound discretion of the trial judge to
determine if a represented party may take part in the presentation of
7
his own case.
The defendant also contended that the trial court acted improperly
when it denied his request to substitute counsel because the court
never thoroughly investigated the factual foundation of his request.8
While the court agreed with the defendant that People v. Marsden9
governed the situation, the court found that the trial court's action
did not "deny the defendant an opportunity to enumerate specific examples of inadequate representation."1 0 Therefore, the supreme
court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not al2. In addition to the evidence of the market incidents, evidence as to a prior robbery, for which the defendant was never convicted, was introduced. Id at 73, 744 P.2d
at 1135, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 602-03. The defendant claimed that the two offenses were
misjoined. The court dismissed this contention holding that: (1) the defendant's failure
to object to the joinder at trial constituted a waiver of his right to object; and (2) that
due to the strength of mini-market murder evidence, mention of the robbery charge of
which the defendant was acquitted could not have produced prejudice. Id. at 77-78, 744
P.2d at 1138-39, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 605-06.
3. Id. at 74, 744 P.2d at 1136, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 603.
4. Id. at 74-75, 744 P.2d at 1136, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 603-04.
5. 422 U.S. 806 (1975). See Note, The Right of Self-Representation in the Capital
Case, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 130 (1985).
6. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 75, 744 P.2d at 1137, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 604 (citation
omitted).
7. Id. at 75-76, 744 P.2d at 1137, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 604. See generally B. WITKIN,
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 337 (1963); 21 CAL. JUR. 3D, pt. 1, CriminalLaw
§ 2945 (rev. ed. 1985).
8. The grounds for the defendant's request for change of attorney was that his
attorney "'don't know how to do nothing.' "Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 76,744 P.2d at 1137,
241 Cal. Rptr. at 605.
9. 2 Cal. 3d 118, 465 P.2d 44, 84 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1970).
10. Miranda,44 Cal. 3d at 76, 744 P.2d at 1138, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 605.
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lowing a substitution of attorney."
The defendant made three assignments of error regarding the jury
selection procedure. First, the defendant asserted that he was
prejudiced because jurors opposed to the death penalty were excluded from the jury, thereby denying him "a representative cross
section of the community."12 This assertion, however, had been rejected in People v. Fields.IS Second, the defendant contended that
the failure to empanel separate juries for each phase of the bifurcated trial was violative of his state and federal constitutional rights.
The court similarly dismissed this contention as it also had been rejected previously.14 Finally, the defendant alleged that the District
Attorney's use of peremptory challenges was violative of the state
constitution in that the exclusion of prospective jurors who may disfavor the death penalty constituted a systematic exclusion. Once
again, the court noted that this issue had already been decided.15
The court next considered the defendant's assertion that the trial
court committed error by admitting into evidence the letter obtained
pursuant to the search conducted when he was booked. The defendant claimed that his counsel was incompetent because his counsel
failed to move for suppression of the letter before the trial as required by section 1538.5 of the Penal Code.16 The court found this
argument to be without merit, as the letter was the product of a lawful booking search.17
11. Id. at 77, 744 P.2d at 1139, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 606 (citations omitted).
12. Id. at 78-79, 744 P.2d at 1139, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
13. 35 Cal. 3d 329, 349, 673 P.2d 680, 692, 197 Cal. Rptr. 803, 815 (1983) (plurality
opinion), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892 (1984). See generally Comment, Sentencing By
Death Qualified Juries and the Right to Jury Nullification, 22 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 289
(1985).
14. Miranda,44 Cal. 3d at 79, 744 P.2d at 1139, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 606 (citing Lockert
v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986)); Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301,
168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980). See generally, B. WrTKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 400C (Supp. Part I 1985); Note, Lockert v. McCree: Conviction-Proneness and the
Constitutionalityof Death-QualifiediJuries,36 CATH.U.L. REV. 287 (1986).
15. Miranda,44 Cal. 3d at 80, 744 P.2d at 1140, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 607 (citing People
v. Zimmerman, 36 Cal. 3d 154, 680 P.2d 776, 202 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1984)). See generally
Winick, ProsecutorialPeremptory Oallenge PracticesIn Capital Cases: An Empirical
Study and a ConstitutionalAnalysis, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1982).
16. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(h) (West 1982). The supreme court rejected the defendant's appellate challenge to the introduction of the letter as untimely. Miranda,
44 Cal. 3d at 80-81, 744 P.2d at 1140, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
17. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 81-82, 744 P.2d at 1141, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 608. The defendant contended that the envelope constituted a closed container and that prying
into the contents unlawfully intruded into his privacy. The court disagreed, believing
that "[a] search of the personal effects of an arrested person at the time of booking is a
reasonable search under the California and federal constitutions." Id. at 81, 744 P.2d at

Regarding the introduction of evidence concerning the 7-Eleven
store incident, the defendant alleged that such evidence was improperly admitted because it constituted "impermissible evidence of an
uncharged attempted robbery"18 pursuant to section 1101 of the Evidence Code. 19 While the court acknowledged that the admission of
this evidence without a limiting instruction constituted error, it con0
sidered this error harmless.2
The next evidentiary contention lodged by the defendant was that
permitting the jail cell tape to be introduced into evidence was violative of his right of privacy, the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, and the sixth amendment right to counsel. The
court found the defendant's reliance on De Lancie v. Superior
Court21 for the creation of a privacy interest to be misplaced because
in Donaldson v. Superior Court,22 the court held that De Lancie was
inapplicable to acts conducted before De Lancie was filed.23 Finally,
the court rejected the defendant's evidentiary assignment of error
that a sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel violation occurred. The court held that the defendant's counsel's failure
to raise the fifth amendment issue could not have prejudiced the defendant because the "right to counsel is not implicated where an accused voluntarily makes statements to a cellmate, who is not acting
24
as a government agent or informant."
The court then focused upon the sufficiency of the evidence which
established premeditation and deliberation. The court looked to the
three categories set forth in People v. Anderson 25 for sustaining a
finding of premeditated murder. Regarding the first category-prior
1141, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 608 (citations omitted). For a thorough definition of the parameters of booking and inventory searches see 2 W.B. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 5.3(a) (2d ed. 1987).
18. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 82, 744 P.2d at 1141, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
19. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(a) (West 1985).
20. Miranda,44 Cal. 3d at 83, 744 P.2d at 1142, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
21. 31 Cal. 3d 865, 647 P.2d 142, 183 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1982) (a person in jail may have
a reasonable expectation of privacy).
22. 35 Cal. 3d 24, 39, 672 P.2d 110, 119, 196 Cal. Rptr. 704, 713 (1983).
23. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 85, 744 P.2d at 1143-44, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 611. In addition, an expectation of privacy was probably not reasonable because the defendant was
repeatedly told by Gonzales that the cells were bugged. Id.at 85 n.10, 744 P.2d at 1114
n.10, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 611 n.10.
24. Id. at 86, 744 P.2d at 1144, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 611 (emphasis in original).
25. 70 Cal. 2d 15, 447 P.2d 942, 73 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1968). The court summarized the
three-category test as follows:
(1) facts about a defendant's behavior before the killing that show prior planning of it; (2) facts about any prior relationship or conduct with the victim
from which the jury could infer a motive; and (3) facts about the manner of
the killing from which the jury could infer that the defendant intentionally
killed the victim according to a preconceived plan.
Miranda,44 Cal. 3d at 86, 744 P.2d at 1144, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 611 (citing Anderson, 70
Cal. 2d at 26-27, 447 P.2d at 949, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 557). See generally 17 CAL. JUR. 3D,
pt.1, CriminalLaw §§ 238-40 (rev. ed. 1984).
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behavior evidencing planning of the crime-the court found "premeditation" from both the evidence that the defendant carried his
gun into the store and that he threatened to shoot the clerks. 26 Assessing the second category--conduct evidencing motive-the court
concluded that the defendant's angry manner when he was refused
the sale of beer evinced motive.27 Finally, as to the third categorymanner evidencing intent and premeditation-the court found that
the victims did not provoke the defendant, which tended to show that
the attack was conceived in advance rather than a "'rash explosion
of violence.' "28 Thus, under all three elements of the Anderson test,
the court found evidence of the defendant's premeditation and deliberation to be sufficient.
Relying on Carlos v. Superior Court,29 the defendant maintained
that the felony-murder special circumstances finding was in error because the trial court did not instruct the jury that intent to kill was a
prerequisite. On the basis of People v. Anderson,30 the court responded that such an instruction is unnecessary absent evidence from
which the jury might find the defendant to be an accomplice rather
than a principal.3 1 Because all the evidence directly indicated that
the defendant was the actual killer, the defendant did not deserve relief under Anderson.3 2
B.

The Penalty Phase

The defendant claimed that under Witherspoon v. Illinois,33 the
trial court erred in excluding two prospective jurors because of their
unwillingness to impose the death penalty. The court noted that the
United States Supreme Court broadened the Witherspoon standard
to allow exclusion for cause where "'the juror's views would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror
26.
27.
28.
(1985)).
29.
30.
31.
son, 43

Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 87, 744 P.2d at 1144, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
Id. at 87, 744 P.2d at 1145, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
Id. (quoting People v. Lunafelix, 168 Cal. App. 3d 97, 102, 214 Cal. Rptr. 33, 36

35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983).
43 Cal. 3d 1104, 742 P.2d 1306, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1987).
Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 89, 744 P.2d at 1146, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 613 (citing AnderCal. 3d at 1138-39, 742 P.2d at 1331, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 611). See generally CAL.
JUR. 3D, supra note 7, §§ 3341, 3343.
32. Id. at 89, 744 P.2d at 1146, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
33. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). See generally 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury §§ 240, 245, 271 (1969);
Colussi, The Unconstitutionalityof Death Qualifying a Jury Prior to the Determination of Guilt: The Fair-Cross-SectionRequirement in Capital Cases, 15 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 595 (1982).

in accordance with his instructions and his oath.'.... 34 After reviewing the record, the court concluded that the trial court could reasonably have understood the jurors' responses to indicate an inability to
vote for the death penalty under any circumstances. 35 Thus, the
court found the exclusion of the potential jurors to be proper.
During the penalty trial, the prosecutor introduced testimony that
the defendant had committed another murder two weeks before the
murder of the store clerk. The defendant correctly contended that it
was error under People v. Robertson 36 for the court not to give an instruction that the jury could not consider the prior murder as evidence unless the defendant's guilt was established beyond a
reasonable doubt. The court found this error to be harmless because
there was an abundance of uncontroverted evidence to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the prior
murder.37
The defendant contended that the court failed to properly instruct
the jury on the use of mitigating and sympathy evidence in the penalty phase as mandated by People v. Easley.38 In rejecting both of
these arguments, the court first noted that Easley dealt only with the
inappropriateness of anti-sympathy instructions. 39 As an instruction
was not given in the present case, the court found Easley to be inapplicable.40 On the issue of mitigating instructions, the court observed
that a trial court must instruct the jury that it may consider any aspect of the defendant's character as mitigating evidence. 4 1 The court
added, however, that the determination of a proper instruction is
made on a case by case basis.42 Based on the lack of mitigating evidence offered by the defense, the court found no error in the trial
43
court's failure to give the mitigation instruction,
The defendant also claimed that several prosecutorial comments
made during summation resulted in prejudice. Because defense
counsel failed to object in a timely manner, the court held that the
34. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 94, 744 P.2d at 1149, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 616-17 (citing
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (other citation omitted by court)). See generally B. WITKIN, supra note 14, §§ 400A, 400B; Note, Jury Selection - Exclusion of
PotentialJurorsin Capital Sentencing CasesNo Longer Requires that Venue Members
Express Their Views About the Death Penalty With Unmistakable Clarity, 16 SETON
HALL 851 (1986).

35. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d at 95-96, 744 P.2d at 1150-51, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 617-18. See
generally B. WITKIN, supra note 7, §§ 405-08.

36. 33 Cal. 3d 21, 655 P.2d 279, 188 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1982).
37. Miranda,44 Cal. 3d at 98, 744 P.2d at 1152, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 619.

38. 34 Cal. 3d 858, 671 P.2d 813, 196 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1983).
39. Miranda,44 Cal. 3d at 102, 744 P.2d at 1115, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
40. Id.
41. Id. (citing Easley, 34 Cal. 3d at 878 n.10, 671 P.2d at 826 n.10, 196 Cal. Rptr. at
322 n.10).
42. Id. at 102-03, 744 P.2d at 1155, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
43. Id. at 103, 744 P.2d at 1156, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 623.
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defendant's right to object to resulting error was waived.44 Thus, the
defendant claimed incompetence of counsel. He contended that his
attorney should have objected to the prosecutor's use of facts allegedly not in evidence. The court found each of the questioned statements to be "based on reasonable inferences from the evidence
before the jury," and if the comments were improper, the court
"fail[ed] to see any possible prejudice arising from the ... brief remarks."45 The defendant argued additionally that the district attorney improperly offered his personal. opinion to the jury when
predicting the possibility of future violence by the defendant. The
court rejected these contentions based upon the factual circum46
stances of the case.
Finally, the court was faced with the contention that the prosecutor improperly commented on the impact on the victim's family that
releasing the defendant would have. The court agreed with the defendant that, pursuant to Booth v. Maryland,47 such comments were
improper.48 The court found this misconduct to be harmless on the
grounds that the remarks were, unlike those in Booth, obvious and
49
nonspecific.
The defendant then contended that his motion for a new trial
should have been granted because during the course of the trial, one
juror had a number of conversations with the defendant's girlfriend
in an effort to get a date with her. The court noted that jury misconduct raises a rebuttable presumption of prejudice.50 The court found
that sufficient evidence existed to support the trial court's conclusion
that the parties involved did not discuss the case.5 1
In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, consolidated with his ap44. Id. at 108, 744 P.2d at 1159, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
45. Id. at 109-10, 744 P.2d at 1160, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 627. See generally CAL. JUR.
3D, supra note 37, § 328.
46. Miranda,44 Cal. 3d at 110-11, 744 P.2d at 1160-61, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 627-28. The
court held that the district attorney's comments were protected as it was not misconduct "to 'merely postulate what the evidence would arguably prove.'" Id. at 110, 744
P.2d at 1160, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 627-28 (citing People v. Ryner, 164 Cal. App. 3d 1075,
1086, 211 Cal. Rptr. 140, 147 (1985)). The court found that the prosecutor's comments
did not misstate the evidence or deprive the defendant of a right to a fair trial. Id. at
111, 744 P.2d at 1161, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 628. See generally B. WITKIN, supra note 7,

§ 452.
47. 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987).
48. Miranda,44 Cal. 3d at 113, 744
49. Id, at 113, 744 P.2d at 1162, 241
50. Id. at 117, 744 P.2d at 1165, 241
ally 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appeal and Error §
51. Miranda,44 Cal. 3d at 117, 744

P.2d at 1162, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
Cal. Rptr. at 629.
Cal. Rptr. at 632 (citations omitted). See gener781 (1962).
P.2d at 1165, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 632.

peal, the defendant made three assignments of error. The court issued an order to show cause for the contention that his counsel's
decision not to present any mitigating evidence at the penalty trial
deprived him of effective assistance of counsel.52 After observing
that the defendant had "the burden of showing that 'counsel failed to
act in a manner to be expected of reasonably competent attorneys...
"53 and that absent this failure, it was probable that the jury would
have returned a more favorable verdict,54 the court considered the
55
relative merit of the party's declarations.
5
6
Citing People v. Durham and People v. Jackson,57 the court declined to hold the defense counsel incompetent because the choice
not to present the mitigating evidence was the result of a reasonably
competent and informed tactical decision58 The court, analogizing
the present facts to those in Jackson, observed that the defense counsel's attempt to invoke mercy rather than rebut the prosecution's evidence was reasonable.59 As such, the defendant's petition for writ of
habeas corpus was denied without an evidentiary hearing.6 0
IV.

JUSTICE BROUSSARD'S CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

Justice Broussard concurred in the court's affirmation of the guilty
verdict and the special circumstances finding. The dissenting portion
condemned the denial of the writ of habeas corpus.6 1 Justice Broussard argued that although a competent tactical choice will negate an
ineffective assistance claim, the tactical choice must be based upon
52. The other assignments of error involved his counsel's failure to develop a diminished capacity defense and the constitutionality of the death penalty as applied in
Los Angeles. Id. at 118, 744 P.2d at 1166, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 633. These claims were dismissed for failure to establish a prima facie case. Id. at 119 n.37, 744 P.2d at 1166 n.37,
241 Cal. Rptr. at 633 n.37.
53. Id. at 119, 744 P.2d at 1166, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 633 (quoting People v. Pope, 23
Cal. 3d 412, 425, 590 P.2d 859, 866, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 739 (1979)).
54. Id. (citing People v. Fosselman, 33 Cal. 3d 572, 584, 649 P.2d 1144, 1151, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 855, 862 (1983)).
55. The declarations showed that the defendant had been abusing drugs and alcohol from an early age and that his delinquent activity resulted from his difficulty in
accepting success. The Attorney General presented declarations showing that as a
matter of trial strategy, presenting this mitigating evidence would have harmed the defendant's chances more than it would have helped.
56. 70 Cal. 3d 171, 449 P.2d 198, 74 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1969) (failing to present mitigating evidence not resulting in ineffective assistance of counsel).
57. 28 Cal. 3d 264, 618 P.2d 149, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1035 (1981) (informed choice of tactics not allowing ineffective assistance of counsel
claim).
58. Miranda,44 Cal. 3d at 121, 744 P.2d at 1167, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
59. Id. at 121, 744 P.2d at 1167-68, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
60. Id. at 123, 744 P.2d at 1169, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 636. See generally 22 CAL. JUR. 3D,
pt. 2 CriminalLaw § 3857 (rev. ed. 1985).
61. Miranda,44 Cal. 3d at 124, 744 P.2d at 1169-70, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 637 (Broussard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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adequate investigation.6 2 Examining the record, Justice Broussard
failed to find evidence of such an investigation. Accordingly, he
would have required an evidentiary hearing to resolve the remaining
factual questions.6 3
V.

CONCLUSION

People v. Miranda adds little of a substantive nature to the law in
California. The decision is significant only in that it re-establishes
the hard-line approach to death penalty issues which was demanded
by California voters as a consequence of the Bird court's leniency.
Justice Broussard's dissent fails to recognize the gravity of the offense committed and would create yet another loophole, in addition
to the plethora offered by the defendant, through which a convicted
killer might escape capital punishment. Although offered the opportunity, the majority did not recognize any such opening, choosing instead to affirm both the trial court's finding of guilt and its
imposition of the death penalty.
STEVEN L. MILLER

V.

INSURANCE LAW
The Legislature intended sections 1032 and 1256 of the
California Unemployment Insurance Code to be read
together; therefore, "spouse" includes an "imminent
spouse" under both sections: Altaville Drug Store, Inc. v.
Employment Development Department.

In Altaville Drug Store, Inc. v. Employment Development Department, 44 Cal. 3d 231, 746 P.2d 871, 242 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1988), the issue
before the California Supreme Court was whether section 1032 of the
California Unemployment Insurance Code was intended by the Legislature to act in accord with section 1256, and thereby apply the "imminent spouse" extension of the latter section to the former. In
reversing the court of appeal, the court held that because sections
1032 and 1256 are in pari materia, ambiguity exists as to the meaning
of "spouse" in section 1032 when compared to section 1256. In attempting to effectuate the purpose of the law by ascertaining the intent of the Legislature, the court looked to Select Base Materials v.
62. Id at 125, 744 P.2d at 170, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
63. Id at 127, 744 P.2d at 1172, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 639.

Board of Equality, 51 Cal. 2d 640, 335 P.2d 672 (1959). The court
found that the Legislature intended to apply the "imminent spouse"
expansion to section 1032. Consequently, the case was remanded to
the trial court with instructions to grant Altaville Drug Store's (Altaville) petition for writ of mandate.
The controversy arose the day before the claimant's marriage when
she voluntarily resigned from employment with the respondent, Altaville, in order to move to a distant location to be with her new husband. Under section 1256, an employee is entitled to unemployment
benefits where she has left her most recent work for good cause.
Section 1256 deems an individual to have left employment with good
cause if it is for the purpose of accompanying a spouse "to a place

from which it is impractical to commute." CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE
§ 1256 (West 1986). In an uncodified provision, section 1256 benefits
were extended to an employee "whose marriage is imminent." 1982
Cal. Stat. ch. 1073, 3873-74. See also MacGregorv. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, 37 Cal. 3d 205, 689 P.2d 453, 207 Cal. Rptr.
823 (1984). Finding that the claimant left for good cause, the petitioner, Employment Development Department (EDD), granted the
benefits and, over the respondent's objection, charged Altaville's reserve account rather than the pooled benefit fund, thereby increasing
the employer's rate of contribution to that fund.
Section 1032 dictates the circumstances under which benefits
awarded to a claimant are charged to the pooled fund. The court rejected EDD's contention that these circumstances did not exist because the claimant was not technically accompanying a "spouse"
pursuant to section 1032. The court recognized that the use of
"spouse" in section 1032 is unambiguous on its face when the statute
is read alone. However, when section 1032 is read together with the
extended definition in section 1256, ambiguity is created.
The court next moved to the determination of whether the "imminent spouse" extension was intended to apply to section 1032. Turning to the 1979 Committee Report on this statute, ASSEM. COMM. ON
FINANCE, INSURANCE AND COMMERCE, REG. SESS., ANALYSIS OF AsSEM. BILL No. 134 (1979-80 Reg. Sess.) (as amended May 12, 1979), the
court found that section 1032 was intended to be a corollary of section
1256 and was passed to remedy the inequitable circumstances facing
an employer whose employee resigned for the purpose of following a
spouse. See generally 58 CAL. JUR. 3D Statutes § 161 (1980); 73 AM.
JUR. 2D Statutes §§ 147-79 (1974). Arguing that it is inequitable to
charge an employer's reserve account where the employee resigns to
join an "imminent spouse," the court held that the objectives of section 1032 were advanced by assigning the word "spouse" an
equivalent meaning in both sections. Section 1032 now requires that
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employment benefits be charged to the pooled fund when an employee leaves work to accompany either a spouse or an imminent
spouse. See generally 81 C.J.S. Social Security and Public Welfare
§§ 220, 226, 291 (1977).
In reaching its conclusion that both section 1032 and section 1256
were intended to apply to situations involving an "imminent spouse,"
the court failed to consider the limits of judicial power. As evidenced
by the court's discussion of the committee report, the legislature seriously considered the appropriate language for section 1032. Yet, after
this consideration, the term "spouse" was left unchanged. By expanding the statute and ignoring the plain language therein, the
court has superimposed its views on unemployment insurance on
those of the legislature. The court acted as a law maker rather than
law interpreter. This type of deviation from the traditional role of
the judiciary is both precedentially dangerous and a serious infringement on the separation of powers doctrine. As noted by Justice Eagleson in his dissent, "[t]he majority's opinion is a well-meaning
effort to resolve what the majority deems to be a statutory inconsistency. I am not persuaded there is one, but, if there is, the Legislature should resolve it." Altaville, 44 Cal. 3d at 241, 746 P.2d at 876,
242 Cal. Rptr. at 738 (Eagleson, J., dissenting).
STEVEN L. MILLER

VI.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Pursuantto section 5205 of the Business and Professions
Code, a county's designation of a parcel of land as a
"DesertSpecial Services Center," even if in conjunction
with a "DesertLiving" designation and the appropriate
site approval,is insufficient to create an area zoned
primarilyfor commercial use, and as such, advertising
billboards sought to be placed adjacent to a highway, may
not be erected: United Outdoor Advertising Co., Inc. v.
Business, Transportation and Housing Agency.

In United Outdoor Advertising Co., Inc. v. Business, Transportation and Housing Agency, 44 Cal. 3d 242, 746 P.2d 877, 242 Cal. Rptr.
738 (1988), the issue before the California Supreme Court was
whether the proposed site for the plaintiff's billboard advertisements
was zoned "primarily" to allow "commercial and industrial activities"
pursuant to section 5205 of the California Business & Professions

Code. In reversing the court of appeal, the court unanimously held
that the Legislature did not intend to allow a county's designation of
an area as a "Desert Special Service Center" (DSSC) to constitute
zoning for commercial purposes, even if such a designation applied to
a "Desert Living" zone and was accompanied by the requisite site approval for commercial use. United OutdoorAdvertising, 44 Cal. 3d at
251, 746 P.2d at 883-84, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 745.
The conflict arose when the plaintiff, United Outdoor Advertising
Co. (Outdoor), proposed the erection of five illuminated billboards
along Interstate 15 in the desert town of Baker in San Bernardino
County. Prior to this action, the county had zoned the proposed sites
"Desert Living" (DL) a residential and agricultural designation permitting commercial or industrial use only with the appropriate site
approval from the county. See generally 101a C.J.S. Zoning and
Planning § 57 (1978). In conjunction with its zoning plan, Baker was
also considered a "Desert Special Service Center," thereby allowing
the town to provide certain services for travelers and residents. In an
effort to comply with the county rules governing a DL zoning
designation, the plaintiff applied to the county for, and received, the
requisite site approval. When Outdoor applied to the Business,
Transportation and Housing Agency (the Agency) for billboard permits, however, the permits were denied under the belief that the proposed sites were not zoned "primarily" for commercial use. See
generally § 130. The plaintiff then asked the superior court for a writ
of mandate requiring the issuance of the permits. The superior court
granted the writ, the court of appeal affirmed, and the Agency appealed to the supreme court.
In affirming the Agency's contention that the proposed advertising
site was not an area "primarily" zoned for commercial use under section 5202 of the Business and Professions Code, the court examined
the legislative history of the statute. The court first noted that the
California Outdoor Advertising Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 5200-31 (West 1974 & Supp. 1988) (the Act), was passed in an effort to conform with the Highway Beautification Act of 1965, 23
U.S.C. § 131 (1982), which established the national standard for advertising along interstate highways. United Outdoor Advertising, 44
Cal. 3d at 245, 746 P.2d at 880, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 741. The court next
commented that under the Act, billboards and other advertising displays along the highway were allowed only in "business areas." Id.
(quoting CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5408 (West Supp. 1988)). Finally,
the court found a "business area" to be any area which is "within
1,000 feet of the nearest edge of a commercial or industrial activity
...
[and also] 'zoned under authority of state law primarily to permit
industrial or commercial activities.'" United Outdoor Advertising, 44
Cal. 3d at 246, 746 P.2d at 880, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 741 (quoting CAL.
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Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5205). See generally B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 471 (8th ed. 1974 & Supp.
1984).
As the court found the first component of the "business area" test
to exist, the analysis centered on the "primarily zoned for commercial activity" requirement. In rejecting the plaintiff's claim that the
site approval and DSSC designation created a primarily commercial
zoning category, the court scrutinized the relationship between the
legislative intent of the Act and the special zoning designations under
the county's general plan. See generally B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 466 (8th ed. 1974 & Supp.
1984). After determining that the Legislature intended the word
"primary" to delineate the "main use" of the land in question, the
court moved to an examination of San Bernardino's DL zone. In
holding that the DL designation did not constitute a zone primarily
for commercial use, the court reasoned that if such a zone was intended to be primarily for commercial use, a site approval for such
use would not be required. Believing the site approval to be "an exception to a general zoning category," United Outdoor Advertising,
44 Cal. 3d at 248, 746 P.2d at 881, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 742 (citations omitted), the court found that the DL zone did not establish a commercial
zone as it fell outside the Legislature's intended requirement of an
"actual" commercial use designation. Id. (citing Gaylord, Zoning:
Variances,Exceptions, and Conditional Use Permits in California,5
UCLA L. REV. 179, 193 (1958)). See generally B. WITKIN, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAW, ConstitutionalLaw § 484 (8th ed. 1974 & Supp.
1984).

Finally, the court examined the implications of the DSSC designation. In rejecting the plaintiff's contention that such a designation
was the equivalent of a commercial zone, the court noted that the
DSSC was not a permissible land use designation, but rather a "statement of development policies" created to cultivate future development. United Outdoor Advertising, 44 Cal. 3d at 249, 746 P.2d at 882,
242 Cal. Rptr. at 743 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302 (West Supp.
1988)). Reasoning that the DSSC was only a temporary classification
that would later be replaced by a traditional permissible land use
designation, the court found that such a classification was not developed "primarily" to provide for commercial use and that, as such, the
DSSC zone was not within the intended scope of the Act. As neither
of the special zoning classifications instituted by San Bernardino
County was sufficient to create a commercial zone, the court denied

the plaintiff's request for a writ of mandate requiring that the
Agency issue the permits allowing the erection of the advertising bill-

boards. See generally B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
ConstitutionalLaw § 465 (8th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1984); 82 AM. JUR. 2D
Zoning and Planning §§ 281-87 (1976); 66 CAL. JUR. 3D Zoning and
Other Land Controls §§ 122-30 (1981); 101a C.J.S. Zoning and Planning § 12 (1978).
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